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II.
ARGUMENT
THE STANDARD OF REVIEW IN THIS APPEAL IS THAT OF
"CORRECTION OF ERROR" AND THERE IS NO DEFERENCE TO BE
GIVEN TO AN ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCYf S INTERPRETATION OF THE
STATUTE IN QUESTION

A.

The Appellee has argued that the standard of review for this
appeal in the abuse of discretion standard pursuant to U.C.A. 6346b-16(4)(h)(i).

This abuse of discretion standard applies where

a statute delegates discretion to an administrative agency.

The

Appellee has cited to no authority in this case that the statute in
question has delegated such discretion to the tax commission.
Furthermore, the Appellee has not attempted to dispute the Utah
Supreme Courtfs standard for review relating to the statutory
construction in tax exemption cases on which the Appellant relies.
See Chris & Dick's Lumber v. Tax Commission, 791 P.2d 511, 513-14
(Utah 1990) ("In the usual case, questions of statutory construction
are matters of law for the courts, and we rely on a fcorrection of
error*

standard

of

review,

according

no

deference

to

an

administrative agency's interpretation") . Based upon the forgoing,
the standard of review in the present appeal is that of correction
of error.
Additionally, the Appellee has asserted that Utah Code Admin.
P. R865-19-37S (1992) is somehow dispositive of the issue before
this Court.

This administrative rule does nothing more than

rearrange the order of the operative words in the statute. To the
extent that this administrative rule is attempting to interpret the
statute, it is accorded no weight and is entitled to no deference.
1

See Chris & Dick's, supra. Since there is no evidence that the tax
commission was given any discretion to interpret the statute at
issue, an administrative rule that attempts to do so is ineffective
for that purpose.
B.

IN APPLYING RULES OF STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION, THE
LEGISLATIVE INTENT AND PURPOSE OF THE TAX EXEMPTION
IN QUESTION WAS TO EXEMPT ANY OXYGEN OR STOMA
SUPPLIES PRESCRIBED BY A PHYSICIAN OR ADMINISTERED
UNDER THE DIRECTION OF A PARAMEDIC, WHICH INCLUDES
AN OXYGEN CONCENTRATOR
1.
Legislative intent and the purpose sought to be
accomplished.

The Appellee would have this Court abandon all rules of
statutory

construction because

of the

general

rule that tax

exemption statutes are to be construed against the taxpayer. This
is not the law, and, of course, the Appellee has cited to no
authority for this novel proposition.

The Appellee^ proposed

construction is unreasonable; "[s]trict construction, however, does
not warrant unreasonable construction." Citv of Liberal v. Seward
County, 802 P.2d 568, 571 (Kan. 1990).

If the Appellee's position

in this regard were the law, the Utah Supreme Court could not have
reached the decision it did in Parson Asphalt Products v. Utah
State Tax Commission, 617 P.2d 397 (Utah 1980), which is outlined
in the Appellantfs Brief.

Thus, an analysis of the issue before

the Court requires the use of the tools of statutory construction
to properly

ascertain the

legislative

intent

concerning what

constitutes exempted medicine.
The primary issue before this Court is what the Utah State
Legislature

intended

when

it permitted
2

a

tax

exemption

for

medicine, which it defined as "any oxygen or stoma supplies
prescribed by a physician or administered under the direction of a
physician or paramedic."

U.C.A.

59-12-102(4)(a)(iii)(emphasis

supplied) . If the legislature had defined "medicine" as "oxygen or
stoma supplies. . ." then the Appellee's interpretation of the
statute would be more credible; but, the legislature chose to use
the adjective any to modify "oxygen."

This usage greatly expands

and broadens the scope of what was intended to be included within
the term

"oxygen."

Any

is "an

•uncompromising1

word to be

considered broadly," Vvtar Associates v. City Annapolis, 483 A.2d
1263, 1266, n. 4 (Md.Ct.App.1984), and it has been interpreted to
mean "all." Winslow v. Morgan County Commissioners. 697 P.2d 1141,
1142 (Colo.Ct.App. 1985).
cases

is

to

dismiss

The Appellee's only response to these

them

because

they

do

not

involve tax

exemptions, though no support is provided to justify the position
that statutory construction cases are irrelevant to determine the
legislative intent in a tax exemption case.
Of all the cases interpreting the word "any," the case of
State v. Caprio. 477 A.2d 67, 70 (R.I. 1984) is particularly
instructive.

In that case,

the court provided an expansive

interpretation of the word "any" and stated that the "very breadth
of the term
persons.

f

any person1 defies the exclusion of any class of

That term is so broad as to require exclusion, not

specific inclusion."

Id.

When the word "any" is used as a

defining adjective, the word it describes becomes all-encompassing
and as broad as that word can possibly be. In the case before this
3

court, "any oxygen. . ." becomes any and all types and kinds of
oxygen is any form whatsoever, whether in a green, metal bottle or
an oxygen concentrator, as long as it is prescribed or administered
bv a physician.

As is explained in State v. Caprio, supra, the

term "any oxygen" "defies the exclusion of any class of [oxygen]."
Id.

In order for any type, kind or form of oxygen to be excluded

pursuant to the exclusion, it must be separately and specifically
excluded.
The Utah legislature has chosen to exclude from the definition
of medicine the following items:

"(i) any auditory, prosthetic,

ophthalmic, or ocular device or appliance; or (ii) any alcoholic
beverage."

U.C.A.

59-12-102(4)(b) (i)&(2) .

However,

the

legislature did not attempt to limit the broad, all-encompassing
definition of "any oxygen" in this limiting language.

Using the

tools of statutory construction to ascertain the legislative intent
in this matter, it appears as though the legislature intended a
broad, expansive interpretation of oxygen.

The Appellee's flawed

analysis of the issue before this Court becomes apparent when the
Appellee attempts to explain why oxygen is excluded and why an
oxygen concentrator would not be.

In its brief, the Appellee

argues that an oxygen concentrator is true to its name:

It

concentrates, but does not create oxygen. Appellee's Brief at 1213. Implicit in this argument is the fallacy that in order to fall
within the "oxygen" tax exemption, the person seeking the exemption
would

have

to

"create"

the

oxygen.

Under

this

creative

interpretation, no one would ever be able to claim this exemption
4

rendering it a nullity because no one can "create" oxygen.
The oxygen in the green cylindrical metal bottles, which the
Appellee would agree is exempt, is nothing but concentrated oxygen
stored until the patient needs some of the oxygen at which point a
valve is turned on and the patient receives the concentrated
oxygen.

This is exempt.

In a more efficient and less expensive

process, a patient would have an oxygen concentrator instead of a
green metal bottle next to him or her. When oxygen is needed, the
patient would turn on the oxygen concentrator valve and the patient
would receive concentrated oxygen, identical to that which would
come out of the green metal bottle.

Under both processes, the

patient receives the same oxygen directly from a small device that
might be sitting next to the patient, all of which is done and
administered under the direction of a doctor or paramedic.

These

processes are almost identical and given the legislature's intent
for a broad interpretation of "any oxygen," the Appellants oxygen
concentrator also falls within the medicine exemption.
III.
CONCLUSION
The Appellant has met its burden of establishing that an
oxygen concentrator falls within the tax exemption of medicine
within the tax exemption statute.

An analysis of the medicine

exemption under the Utah Sales Tax Act, applying accepted rules of
statutory construction, compels the conclusion that the Legislature
intended that such a device as the oxygen concentrator be covered
under the "any oxygen and stoma supplies" exemption to the sales
5

tax act.

Failure to permit such an exemption ignores reality and

is nonsensical.
innovation

that

The oxygen
provides

the

efficiently and at less cost.

concentrator
same

is

a technological

concentrated

oxygen

more

Such a technological advance that

provides oxygen to patients under the direction of a physician
should be treated the same as traditional bottled oxygen, which is
only a reflection of a reality that the two are virtually the same
product.
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